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Election Aftermath: 
"Promise of Democracy" in Kenya 
FRANK HOLMQUIST and 
MICHAEL FORD with 
FRANWHITE 
This past winter, Michael 
Ford and Frank Holmquist served 
as part of a U.S. observation team 
that traveled to Nairobi to moni-
tor elections that many Kenyans 
and other observers hoped would 
remove the authoritarian President 
Daniel Arap Moi, and herald a 
new opening for multiparty 
democracies in Africa. The observ-
er mission was organized by the 
International Republican Institute 
(IRI), that was awarded the obser-
vation contract from the U.S. 
Agenry for International Develop-
ment's African Regional Electoral 
Assistance Fund The /RI competes 
for election observation contracts 
in Africa with three other organi-
zations, the Carter Center of 
Emory University, the African-
American Institute, and the 
National Democratic Institute 
(ND/). Both /RI and ND/ receive 
funding from the National 
Endowment for Democracy, which 
is fonded by the U.S. government. 
FORD-Asili party rally in Uhuru Parle in Nairobi 
prior to the election. 
Photo Betty Press/ Africa Rq,ort. 
The preliminary and final 
reports on the election were written 
by members of the observation 
team. Ford and Holmquist were 
chosen as observers because of their 
knowledge of Kenyan issues and 
not because of their political affili-
ations. Frank Holmquist teaches 
African politics, and Michael Ford 
teaches .African and African-
American politics and is Dean of 
Multicultural Ajfa.irs at Hamp-
shire College in Amherst, .MA. 
Though the December 29 elec-
tion did return Moi and his ruling 
party to power, the political land-
s cape was dramatically altered 
during the two years leading up 
to the election, and in its after-
math. RESIST board member 
Fran White interviewed Ford and 
Holmquist on their return about 
what happened, and what can be 
expected as the openingfor popular 
organizing widens in the years to 
come. What follows is an edited 
version of the interview. 
Fran White: Given that President 
Moi was returned to power, what 
was the significance of the election 
result? 
Michael Ford: It's true that Presi-
dent Moi and the ruling party, 
KANU (The Kenya African National 
Union), were returned to power. But 
it's also true that Moi was returned 
continued on page three 
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From noon to 6:30 PM, participants in the 1993 
March on Washington for Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual 
Rights marched from the ellipse down Pennsylvanian 
Avenue and onto the mall. We'll never know the real 
numbers, but it was huge! Photo: Ellen Shub. 
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''Promise of Democracy'' in Kenya conJinuedfrompageone 
to power with less than 40% of the 
total vote cast; in parliament, there 
were 188 contested seats - opposi-
tion candidates won 88 of them. 
While the election didn't trigger the 
kind of profound change that many 
Kenyans had wished for, it was still a 
significant demonstration of disaf-
fection by many, many people in the 
country. A closed political system 
opened, allowing opposition parties 
and real political debate. 
Frank Holmquist: Only five years 
ago, the world (including much of 
the academic world) had grown very 
comfortable with the fact that by 
and large Africa was ruled by basi-
cally authoritarian regimes. The 
recent rise of democracy movements 
in Kenya and in other countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa was quite 
unexpected. 
MF: The last election in Kenya in 
1988 was markedly different from 
this one. In that election, as in those 
before, only one party was allowed to 
contest, and there was only one can-
didate for president. In order to vote, 
people had to line up in a queue 
behind a poster of the candidate they 
supported and be counted, obviously 
eluding any pretense of a secret bal-
lot. As one might expect, many peo-
ple were intimidated into supporting 
candidates favored by the president, 
the government, and the party hier-
archy. Even in those areas where 
there was significant opposition to 
particular government supported 
candidates, fraudulent election 
results were recorded in favor of offi-
cially favored candidates despite the 
real tally. 
Everyone, including the govern-
ment, now agrees that the 1988 vote 
was thoroughly rigged. So, the 
recent vote took place in a remark-
ably changed context. It was a real 
sea change. 
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Woman voting in Kenyan election December 29th, 1992. Photo: Betty Press/Africa Rq,ort. 
FW: This is thirty years after inde-
pendence in Kenya. One would 
think that one of the goals of 
African nationalism would have 
been democracy. Why has it taken 
this long? 
FH: Democracy was certainly one 
part of the nationalist struggle for 
independence in the sense that there 
was the desire to return government 
to the people, and for Africa to re-
claim itself politically. There was 
also a call for significant economic 
reform. There were, in fact, great 
expectations for what independence 
would bring. At the same time, as is 
true of most nationalist struggles, 
there wasn't a great deal of debate 
about the precise political structure 
that would emerge after indepen-
dence. In much of Africa, the trans-
fer of power from colonial rule to 
independent governments followed 
a kind of codified process. There 
was an election - maybe one or 
two elections - in which one or 
more parties contested, and a new 
government came to power. The 
nationalist period saw the popula-
tion winning certain democratic 
rights. 
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MF: During the nationalist period 
the notion of equality formed a sig-
nificant part of the meaning of 
democracy, which meant that there 
should be a more equitable distribu-
tion of resources, as well as an end 
to the kind of racial discrimination 
that was characteristic of the colo-
nial period. In the recent Kenyan 
election, however, "democracy" 
essentially meant guaranteeing the 
kind of forms and procedures that 
we've come to recognize in Western 
democracies, primarily as a way for 
the opposition to gain access to the 
state. 
We were in Kenya prior to the 
elections last summer, and we talked 
to leading members of the most sig-
nificant opposition parties and read 
the party manifestos. There was very 
little, if any, talk of serious redistri-
bution of resources. It just isn't on 
the current agenda. In fact, their 
manifestos sounded very much like 
the platforms of the ruling party; the 
World Bank and other international 
agencies would have found them 
eminently acceptable. 
With socialist and egalitarian 
ideologies falling on hard times, the 
contin~d on next page 
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call for democracy emerged as a 
protest ideology, embracing a host 
of competing interests. And the 
sudden political opening after years 
of repression may have "selected" for 
political organizations to emerge 
based in the middle class and some-
times financed by people of wealth. 
Background to the Election 
FW: So, the ideological terrain has 
shifted in Kenya as in most of 
Africa? 
FH: Yes, but that requires some 
explanation. Kenya's political history 
is one of the more fractious in Africa 
in that its struggle for independence 
included a major guerilla war that 
occurred roughly between 1952 and 
1955. Workers and peasants recog-
nized that the colonial government 
was still aligned with the European 
settlers who had come at the turn of 
the century, and there didn't seem to 
be any way to dislodge that alliance 
shon of war. 
The result was an extraordinary 
mobilization of the population 
against the state, which also con-
tributed, during the late colonial 
and early independence years, to 
class tensions that were quite overt 
and upfront. When independence 
was gained in 1963, those tensions 
could have been expressed in a for-
mal way through a multiple party 
system of debate, struggle, and con-
test through the ballot box. Instead, 
what happened in Kenya, as in 
much of sub-Saharan Africa, was the 
rise of the authoritarian state. 
By the late sixties and early sev-
en ti es in Africa, as new regimes 
came into power, nationalist coali-
tions that had come together around 
an ideology of "we are all Kenyans, 
we are all Ugandans," came apart 
once the common opposition was 
gone. 
The new (and soon "threat-
ened") regimes began to distance 
themselves from the people in vari-
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ous ways in order to stay in power: 
by holding elections irregularly; by 
banning or making it difficult for 
opposition panies to function; by, in 
some cases, declaring an official one-
party state; by exerting formal or 
informal press censorship; by mak-
ing it difficult for autonomous orga-
nizations to function; by drawing 
trade unions into umbrella organiza-
tions monitored by the state, and so 
forth. The result was, inevitably, 
increasing popular alienation, grow-
ing corruption, and a tendency 
toward military coups-d'etat as the 
only way to rotate leadership, in the 
absence of a formal, civilian, com-
petitive possibility. 
External suppon was often criti-
cally imponant in maintaining these 
authoritarian governments, as U.S. 
support of extremely unpopular 
regimes in Liberia, Sudan and Zaire 
indicates. In the 1980s, the U.S. 
granted Kenya nearly 170 million 
dollars in military aid. In this con-
text, the call for democracy is an 
attempt to acquire sufficient politi-
cal space to simply, in the words of a 
Kenyan academic, "have a politics" 
in the open and in the light of day. 
In time, a politics of equity may 
emerge. 
FW: So, something seems to have 
changed in the late 1980s, and a 
democracy movement developed, 
not only in Kenya but throughout 
Africa - but why at this particular 
moment? 
FH: The rise of democracy move-
ments can be traced to both internal 
and external sources. The internal 
momentum that developed in the 
1980s was due in part to the pain of 
declining economies in Kenya and 
throughout the continent. In the 
midst of the debt crisis and a variety 
of credit/donor imposed economic 
policies ( often termed structural 
adjustment), the standard of living 
of almost everybody declined, and 
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populations became more alienated 
from governments. 
As the Kenyan regime felt 
increasingly besieged in the 1980s 
by the economic crisis, and by what 
it viewed as growing opposition to 
the regime on an ethnic basis (pri-
marily Kalenjin, President Moi's 
group, versus the Kikuyu, predomi-
nant in the economy).., the govern-
ment increasingly drew up the wag-
ons, becoming more centralized, 
undermining autonomous organiza-
tions even more, using preventative 
detention laws, manipulation of the 
judiciary, and even using torture. 
The abuses are documented in sorry 
detail in a book published by Africa 
Watch, Kenya: Taking Liberries. 
Meanwhile the middle class, 
which had expanded since indepen-
dence, was feeling the economic 
pinch quite strongly. They were 
increasingly unable to practice the 
skills that they had trained for, 
whether they were journalists, or 
lawyers, or ministers, or accoun-
tants. Journalists, for example, were 
harassed and sometimes jailed when 
their reporting was deemed offen-
sive, and severe editorial self-censor-
ship was necessary to remain in pub-
lication. 
Two groups emerged as central 
to the organization and voice of the 
democracy movement - lawyers 
and the churches. Many lawyers 
were called upon to defend the indi-
viduals who were detained or 
imprisoned for a variety of political 
activities; defending these individu-
als meant that lawyers themselves 
were harassed, some were put in jail, 
some experienced torture, so they 
became increasingly drawn in as an 
oppositional voice. 
Church personnel spoke out 
against queuing in elections and 
against political detentions. As time 
went on the churches came together, 
to the extent that, in 1992, they 
could form a united front vis-a-vis 
the regime on cenain issues. Univer-
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sity students had long been a source 
of opposition, as well, as indicated 
by the frequency with which the 
regime dosed down the University 
in order to disperse and neutralize 
student and many faculty voices. 
At the same time, the outside 
world changed dramatically. The 
end of the Cold War meant that to 
the major western donors and Japan, 
it was no longer necessary to fight 
the global struggle against Commu-
nism in each and every country of 
Africa. The end of the Cold War 
essentially allowed some breathing 
room in the sense that the embassies 
could focus on economic issues. The 
view emerged in some academic and 
diplomatic circles that since authori-
tarian states had presided over eco-
nomic decline, democratic practices 
could do no worse and might well 
improve state management of the 
economies. 
The end of. the Cold War also 
opened up some space for human 
rights organizations in the West 
(including some voices in the U.S. 
Congress) to express their concerns 
about the substantial amounts of 
money the U.S. gave each year to a 
regime that seemed to be very hos-
tile to basic civil rights. Africa 
Watch, for example, emerged as a 
very strong voice, able to get infor-
mation about human rights viola-
tions to people in Congress and the 
media. Eventually popular human 
rights concerns were heard in 
Congress which forced the Bush 
administration to freeze the FY 
1990 military aid destined for 
Kenya. The whole arena regarding 
civil rights in Africa began to 
change, because suddenly these voic-
es were given greater respectability 
than before, and they could point to 
now quite visible democracy move-
ments in Africa that were protesting 
human rights abuses. 
By 1990, several events occurred 
which would allow a dissident 
movement within Kenya to actually 
rise and maintain itself against Moi. 
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MF: Two dramatic events occurred 
in 1990. First, in February, a For-
eign Minister, Robert Ouko, was 
assassinated. By some accounts, 
Ouko was beginning to question the 
corrupt practices of certain key gov-
ernment figures. 
The U.S. ambassador, Smith 
Hempstone, made quite a hard-hit-
ting speech at the Rotary Club in 
Nairobi, outlining the kind of 
human rights abuses that character-
ized Kenya. He essentially called for 
Moi said that it would be 200 years 
before a multi-party democracy 
could be established in Kenya. In 
November of 1991, the donor 
nations that give aid to Kenya met 
in Paris and decided they would 
cease the flow of fast-dispersing aid 
(i.e. foreign exchange relief) until 
Kenya met certain economic condi-
tions. They wanted the government, 
among other things, to shrink its 
payroll, cut budget deficits, and pri-
vatize some of its government-con-
• 
The lack of an organized left in Kenya 
made the donors and the West for more willing to go 
along with, encourage, even cheer for elections, because there 
would not be a diplomatic "loss, " nor would a regime be likely 
to emerge that would challenge the structural 
adjustment policies of the West. 
• 
Kenya to inaugurate a multi-party 
democratic state. 
As the year went on, a group 
formed that was led, in part, by 
some of the old politicians from 
KANU that had become disaffected. 
They were joined by some younger 
politicians and professionals, and 
they established the Forum for the 
Restoration of Democracy (FORD). 
The leader that emerged, Oginga 
Odinga, was a figure long associated 
with popular· oppositional politics in 
Kenya. The group attempted to reg-
ister as a party at that point, but was 
turned down. 
Shortly thereafter a leading 
church spokesperson, Anglican 
Bishop Alexander Muge, who was 
critical of the regime, died in suspi-
cious circumstances in a road acci-
dent. Also, two major opposition 
politicians were arrested and 
detained in response to their efforts 
to get multi-party democracy insti-
tutionalized. These events led to a 
sharp focusing of energies on the 
part of many people who came 
together in FORD. 
At one point in 1991, as the 
pressure was mounting, President 
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trolled agencies. In addition, they 
put political conditions on the deliv-
ery of aid, requiring civil rights 
abuses to cease, and the opening of 
the political system. 
Within a month following the 
Paris meeting, the Kenyan constitu-
tion was changed so that a multipar-
ty structure could exist legally. 
FW: Women activists were impor-
tant in increasing the pressure for 
change, weren't they? I know they 
were involved in some very dramatic 
and symbolic actions. 
MF: During the 1990-1992 period, 
there were several instances of 
women's groups coming to the fore. 
Mothers of the detained political 
prisoners mounted a demonstration 
in downtown Nairobi. They staged 
a sit-in in Uhuru Park, renaming the 
area Freedom Corner. They were 
gassed and beaten by the police to 
break up the protest. 
One woman in particular, 
Wangari Maathai, became a symbol 
of resistance and opposition. Her 
institutional base was the Green-belt 
continued on next page 
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tree-planting movement which she 
chaired. Her environmental activism 
was the catalyst for her work orga-
nizing women at the local level in 
Kenya. 
Elections are set 
Once the elections were set, 
there were nine official parties con-
testing, though only four of them 
( the ruling party, KANU, and three 
opposition parties) were serious con-
tenders. FORD, which had become 
the leading political party in opposi-
tion, split into two sections, FORD-
Kenya and FORD-Asili, with pre-
dominant Luo and Kikuyu ethnic 
bases respectively. 
From the time the election was 
announced, until it was actually 
held, about three weeks later than. 
originally scheduled, the parties 
faced an extraordinary task: to get 
organized as national parties with a 
leadership and an agenda, and to 
extend that organization down to 
the local level. Additionally, efforts 
had to be made to ensure that the 
elections were fair, particularly in 
light of the 1988 elections, which 
were thoroughly unfair and rigged. 
Thousands of Kenyans organized to 
monitor the elections and establish 
practices that would make it much 
more difficult for the government to 
cheat the rightful winners out of 
their victories. All opposition parties 
were eager to have international 
observers as well. 
Regarding domestic observers, 
the goal was to have two national 
election monitoring unit delegates at 
each of 10,500 polling sites. Al-
though that target was not reached, 
there were probably 15,000 or so 
people enrolled in this effort. Addi-
tionally each party provided official 
monitors at the polling sites. There 
were other Kenyan observation 
teams as well as a set of international 
observers. The U.S. had the largest 
international delegation with about 
60 of us. The next largest was the 
Page Six 
Commonwealth delegation, which 
had about 40. The AFL-CI O sent 6 
or 7 delegates, at the request of the 
Congress of Trade Unions of Kenya. 
Within a very short period of 
time, and with tremendous effec-
tiveness, organizations were put in 
place for both election monitoring 
and civic education designed to 
teach people how to vote and partic-
ipate in a democratic election. It was 
truly remarkable. 
A woman named Maria Nwmo, 
at the University, headed up an 
effort to train and tutor women to 
enter the electoral arena at both the 
national and local level. This even-
tually led to 12 or 13 women surfac-
ing to contest for parliamentary 
seats, and scores of women contest-
ing local seats, at the civic level. 
FH: On election day there was a 
kind of symbiosis between Kenyan 
election monitors and the outside 
observers. The outside observers had 
vehicles and could get around from 
polling place to polling place, so 
when we would pull in to particular 
polling station, we would exchange 
notes with the local monitors. They 
were far better able to spot irregular-
ities than the international ob-
servers. They were well trained and 
knew exactly what to look for. For 
MF: Division among the opposition 
was the main reason. The president 
was re-elected nationwide with less 
than 40% of the vote. The other 
60% of the votes cast were split 
among major opposition candidates. 
In parliament, 88 opposition 
candidates won, out of 188 seats. In 
20 parliamentary districts, the ruling 
party fielded the only candidate. In 
those districts, other candidates had 
stepped down, for a number of rea-
sons. Some of the opposition candi-
dates were really ruling party people 
in disguise, who got nominated and 
then stepped down to assure that the 
"official" ruling party candidate 
would win. In other instances, can-
didates were bought off. And, in 
some places there was intimidation 
of candidates. (The president is 
also allowed by the Constitution 
to appoint twelve members of 
parliament.) 
FH: A number of candidates have 
reported that they were not allowed 
to present papers on nomination 
day because they were detained by 
local authorities. 
MF: I didn't hear a lot about candi-
dates withdrawing as a result of 
threats or intimidation. My guess is 
the ruling party was shrewd enough 
• 
If you set up a shadow candidate who 
steps down, it's hard to prove what happened, and 
you can't easily be accused of violating someone's rights, 
as compared to smashing someone over the head 
to force them out of the election. 
• 
example, they spotted party sup-
porters attempting to bribe voters, 
· or provide counterfeit voting cre-
dentials to loyal henchmen. 
FW: Why didn't the opposition 
win, given this effective network of 
opposition groups and election 
monitoring? 
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to avoid this tactic, and to use other 
ploys which were less likely to draw 
the heat of domestic and interna-
tional complaint. If you set up a 
shadow candidate who steps down, 
it's hard to prove what happened, 
and you can't easily be accused of 
violating someone's rights, as 
compared to smashing someone over 
the head to force them out of the 
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Sealing the ballot boxes at the end of the day, before 
sending them to ballot-counting centers. Nakuru, 
central Kenya. Photo: Joseph Balcer, IRI. 
election. 
State Terror 
FH: A critical backdrop to this elec-
tion was a form of state sponsored 
terror that took place in early 1992. 
The government termed what hap-
pened "ethnic clashes" in which 
about 1,000 people were killed and 
about 50,000 more were displaced 
and became domestic refugees. 
These outbreaks occurred primarily 
in the Rift Valley, the area where the 
president was strongest, and also in 
areas bordering this region. 
The first major investigation 
into these localized events was done 
by a coalition led by churches. They 
reported that what occurred was 
government inspired. The evidence 
to support this was overwhelming. 
There were instances of government 
helicopters that were seen involved. 
There was also an instance in which 
a local state official addressed "war-
riors" before they went out on their 
mission, and so forth. There was a 
stunning lack of arrests by a govern-
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ment that seemed, however, to be 
very capable of finding and routing 
out opposition and dissident activi-
ties. The public was supposed to 
believe that this same government 
was suddenly utterly unable to cope 
with the "clashes." 
The weapons used weren't terri-
bly traditional. In fact, the arrows 
appeared to be recently imported 
from South Korea. And the actual 
attacks were done in a manner that 
reflected considerable training. The 
initial "warriors" that went into bat-
tle against defenseless, unarmed peo-
ple, had bows and arrows. These 
were followed by people with guns. 
And the response by the govern-
ment, in terms of bringing aid to 
the victims, was miniscule. Church-
es became the only refuge and the 
only means to provide food and 
shelter. 
One outcome of these dashes 
was that thousands of people had to 
abandon their homes, and as a result 
they couldn't vote. There was an 
attempt to get the Election Com-
missioner to agree to provide mobile 
voting stations at refugee centers. 
Although he agreed to do this, ulti-
mately the mobile stations were not 
provided. 
Even though we suspect the gov-
ernment was behind all this, and 
most Kenyans believed it was, this 
didn't mean the public was turned 
directly and decidedly against the 
government or the ruling party or 
the president. ~t may have turned 
people inward. They. became fearful. 
The fact that there was an ethnic 
character, however engineered, to 
these clashes, meant that one 
couldn't trust anybody outside one's 
ethnic group. So, while you might 
expect that this would have a galva-
nizing effect, and it did on the level 
of the opposition leadership, it 
didn't have that kind of unifying 
effect on the people. 
along ethnic lines? 
FH: Yes, but this is not to· say that 
ethnic groups are always united. 
They are not. But, ethnic strategies 
and tactics were at the centerpiece of 
the election on the part of both the 
government and the opposition. For 
example, one opposition figure said 
"we would go into a meeting and all 
we'd talk about was who was from 
what tribe, and what the impact 
would be of nominating this or that 
person for this or that area." One 
can't help but think that the bout of 
state terror exacerbated ethnic ten-
sions throughout society and even 
among the opposition. 
Ethnic politics in Kenya has 
roots going back to the colonial 
period. I think it's fair to say these 
elections did not do anything 
to ameliorate those tensions, or 
bring to the fore other kinds of 
issues, programs, or ideological divi-
sions that might cut across those 
ethnic differences. 
Prior repression, the lack of a 
compelling left economic agenda, 
and an opposition led by an urban 
middle class and men of wealth 
meant that these concerns did not 
gain widespread support, and so 
ethnic differences dominated by 
default. The leadership of the oppo-
sition was from a well-to-do ele-
ment, a kind of professional middle 
class that was not drawn to a radical 
economic program. 
It's also the case, though rarely 
stated, that the lack of an organized 
left, even a populist left, in Kenya 
made the donors and the West far 
more willing to go along with, 
encourage, even cheer for elections, 
because there would not be a diplo-
matic "loss," nor would a regime be 
likely to emerge that would chal-
lenge the structural adjustment eco-
nomic policies of the West. 
fW': What can you say about how 
fW': Are you saying that some of the fair the elections really were? 
fragmentation of the opposition was continued on next page 
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MF: Our delegation did not say that 
the elections were not fair. There 
were various levels of equivocation 
by each of the delegations. 
FW: To say that they were not not 
fair is not to say that they were fair? 
MF: Right. Most of the delegations 
didn't want to say that, because 
there was widespread abuse. It was 
clear that the government had lots 
and lots of money, and sometimes 
they were very open about bribing 
voters. Clearly, there was intimida-
tion. So none of the delegations 
were about to give a clean bill of 
health to the elections. 
But, by not coming out and say-
ing there was fraud, one reporter 
asked, aren't you lending an impri-
matur to a fraudulent election? I 
think the answer is probably no. I 
think the majority of Kenyans were 
able to cast ballots in secret for 
someone of their own choosing, 
even given the bribery, a range of 
fraudulent practices, and some 
intimidation. 
I came to believe, and had been 
told by Kenyans, that there would 
be significant violence if it was 
thought that the government was 
stealing the election. The violence 
did not occur. Observers noted that 
in oppositional strongholds, people 
were able to vote quite freely, and 
the parliamentary results showed 
that. My conclusion, then, is that 
most Kenyans felt these were accept-
able, if not ideal, elections. 
Just before the elections, it was 
clear it was not going to be a level 
playing field, and we, as the U.S. 
delegation, along with the Com-
monwealth delegation, were going 
to issue a report saying there could 
not be a free and fair election given 
the tilt of the playing field. But the 
opposition insisted that they didn't 
want us to say that kind of thing. 
They wanted the election to go on. 
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Most of us felt that given the history 
. of the regime, given the context in 
which the elections were held, our 
job was to help create an electoral 
environment in which the opposi-
tion could contend vigorously. 
Role of International Observers 
FH: There are different ways to 
understand the political role of these 
observation groups. I think the ide-
ology of neutrality is convenient for 
everyone, but it is almost impossible 
in the midst of this highly con-
tentious environment to avoid the 
fact that what you say will have 
major political impact. 
One of the mistakes of these 
observation missions (or, as one per-
son called us, the "democracy 
police,") that swoop out of the skies 
in this almost imperial fashion, is 
not realizing that the moment of 
truth really isn't so much in judg-
ment of the actual elections, or even 
in our final reports. The missions 
themselves are perhaps best seen as 
part of a broader political process, of 
opening up or keeping open a polit-
ical system. One can think of obser-
vation teams as part of a threat to 
whomever might wish to close down 
a system or make an egregious inter-
vention that would make a mod-
icum of fair play impossible. 
So the moment of significant 
influence probably comes well 
before the election. Advance mis-
sions and interim reports, for exam-
ple, are very important and seem to 
get more press than the final reports. 
Michael was part of an advance 
team which wrote a report a couple 
weeks before the election that was 
probably more important than any-
thing said after the election. That 
was because the interim report 
described a variety of government 
practices that the observers believed 
could compromise the election. The 
government took note of some of 
these and responded quite positively, 
removing restrictions which inter-
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fered with the conduct of public 
meetings, for example . 
The actual report following the 
election was universally ignored by 
the international press, and was not 
given much play locally either. Part 
of the reason, of course, is that 
everyone wants an unambiguous 
result. The sort of nuanced result we 
observed is hard to digest the day 
after. 
We all experienced interactions 
before the elections that suggested 
people were glad there were outside 
observers, who could respond if 
things really went awry. At the same 
time, they knew very well the limits 
of our eyes, and our ability to sniff 
out actual abuses. 
MF: We were a resource, and a 
mouthpiece to the outside world. 
Kenyans were as aware as we were 
that international aid was being held 
up, and that if we ended up saying 
these elections were thoroughly 
rigged and not free and fair, there 
was great likelihood that aid would 
not be released. That was always the 
"club," and we were important in 
that respect. 
FH: The Kenyan election monitors 
came up with the same conclusion 
- that yes, there were abuses, but 
that the election should stand. 
The Aftermath 
FW: The opposition was disap-
pointed by the election. But was the 
ruling party also disappointed? I 
haven't noticed any aid flooding in 
to Kenya, even though that was 
the regime's objective in having the 
election? 
MF: There's still uncertainty about 
what the election meant in the eyes 
of Western donors and other 
observers. The newly elected KANU 
government was formed with virtu-
ally no representation of the two 
largest and most important ethnic 
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groups, the Kikuyu and the Luo. 
The government therefore has the 
difficult task of ruling with no links 
to some of the wealthiest, best-edu-
cated and well organized ethnic cate-
gories in the country. Western 
observers are aware of this instability. 
And the strategy of the current Ken-
yan government is unclear. Donors 
continue to complain that the 
regime is dragging its feet on eco-
nomic reforms. And privately, diplo-
matic sources sometimes allege that 
widespread corruption continues. 
PW": So what is the future of democ-
racy in Kenya? 
FH: Certainly one has to ask what 
was gained, and what exactly did 
people want from the election? Most 
people wanted a change of regime. 
Moi has been in power since 1978, 
and that's a long time. People also 
wanted to institute the rule of law. 
As the 1980s went on, the regime 
became increasingly a law unto 
itself. One couldn't talk seriously 
about political issues with anyone, 
even your good friends, and that 
kind of regime made people feel 
very uneasy, so any opportunity to 
change that was welcome. 
There were also hopes that a 
new government might be less cor-
rupt. Some rather breathtaking cor-
ruption was going on utterly 
unchecked. For example, the Audi-
tor General would annually present 
his report to parliament saying 
departments were minus a certain 
amount of money, only to find his 
reports were simply ignored. 
There was also a hope that 
development could be put back on 
track and there could be greater 
political stability. And, finally, peo-
ple wanted to regain a political 
v01ce. 
In the short run, development is 
not going to be enhanced in any 
substantial way. Political stability is 
uncertain, although perhaps the 
government has bought a modicum 
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of legitimacy for the moment. But it 
is very weak in several geographic 
areas. The application of the rule of 
law is an open question. The elec-
tion allowed an opening of the 
political system, making it a bit 
more difficult to dose down again. 
That opening along with respect for 
certain kinds of civil rights, is per-
haps the major victory, and it's no 
small victory. It is certainly a neces-
sary precursor to any politics of eco-
nomic reform. You have to have an 
ability to form an organization and 
to hold your own vis-a-vis the state. 
Prior to this election, that had been 
all but impossible. 
Just recently, in early May, we . 
learned that the Congress of Trade 
Unions, ostensibly controlled by the 
government, called a general strike, 
demanding a 100% wage increase 
and calling for the resignation of 
Kenya's vice-president. This un-
precedented action signals a new vis-
ibility of working class organization 
in Kenya's democracy, something 
not seen prior to the election. 
MF: There is a new political situa-
tion which may or may not endure. 
There is the possibility for holding 
the government's feet to the fire and 
making them be at least minimally 
accountable to a broader range of 
social forces. Opposition leaders can 
now more vocally question a variety 
of policies. 
Of course the barriers to any 
widening of this new political space 
are formidable, because the govern-
ment still holds most ·of the cards. 
But now, for the first time, the gov-
ernment has to learn to deal with an 
oven opposition. This is not to say 
that there weren't oppositional voices 
before, but in the context of a one 
party system, it meant that you had 
to figure out a way to get to a lead-
ing politician from a particular eth-
nic group in a particular area, and 
use the influence he had to bring 
people into line. Now the dynamic is 
somewhat different. 
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Whether that difference will lead 
to real institutionalization of civil 
rights and democracy is not at all 
dear. The government has certainly 
shown that it is willing to buy off 
people at almost any cost. The next 
year or two will show whether or not 
the opposition groups will be able to 
organize effectively and bridge their 
differences so that they can really 
contend with the government. 
PW": Does it seem that ethnic dashes 
will remain a tactic of the govern-
ment? 
MF: Probably. They certainly con-
tinued throughout 1992 and after 
the elections. Government initiated 
and condoned ethnic clashes can 
help secure strongholds and mar-
ginalize "outsiders." The govern-
ment runs the risk, though, of incit-
ing counterattacks. The president 
and his closest allies are from rela-
tively small ethnic groups so there is 
a danger of pushing this strategy too 
far. The tactic also risks the gradual 
breakdown of social order. 
FW": What are some of the pressing 
problems now that the elections are 
over? 
FH: In the near future, the economy 
of the country will be a major con-
cern. Kenyan currency has recently 
been devalued quite radically, raising 
the cost of imports and triggering 
inflation. Inflation may also be a 
result of money being printed by the 
government to spend in partisan 
ways during the election. 
The real test of Kenya's democ-
racy will be whether it can develop a 
regime of sufficient legitimacy to 
deal effectively with those problems. 
Right now, it's unclear what will 
happen. The spectre of economic 
decline and social and political dis-
integration that took place in Ugan-
da in the 1970s and 1980s, and is 
currently taking place in Liberia, 
continued on next page 
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Chad, and Somalia next door, is a 
very sobering one, and Kenyans are 
very much aware of it. 
When we were in Kenya prior to 
the elections, we heard several peo-
ple say that if the elections didn't 
occur or were not fair and the 
regime remained in place, there 
would be civil war. So many people 
said it so many times that it was 
clear to us there was something very 
deep and very ominous going on. 
And others have said, for example, 
that some of the old guerilla fighters 
of the 19 50s were admonishing the 
young people not to take up arms 
because the costs are too great. A 
young army man, when asked if 
people were taking up arms, said, 
"Well, we do know that certain peo-
ple are taking 'defensive' measures." 
Of course, one person's defense is 
another's offense. 
Another friend of ours said, "If 
you look in some of the Nairobi 
hardware stores you'll notice it's very 
hard to find two-inch pipe... . " All 
of which is to say, that Kenya, seen 
as sort of the "great stable hope" in 
Eastern Africa, is not as stable as 
many thought. 
FW: What should U.S. policy be 
toward Africa as a whole, and toward 
Kenya in the aftermath of the 
election? 
MF: For us in the U.S., we must ask 
what our government will do now. 
Given the cessation of the Cold 
War, what are U.S. interests in 
Africa? Increasingly, with Africa's 
limited strategic value and weakened 
economies, some people are answer-
ing "we don't have any interest." 
The danger is that Africa will steadi-
ly fall off the policy map. 
Some of Clinton's advisors 
maintain that support for democra-
cy should be a main feature of our 
foreign policy in the post-Cold War 
era. If that is true, the U.S. would 
presumably find ways to support 
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Kenyan democracy after the elec-
tions. Resources devoted to Africa. 
are declining and aid budgets are 
likely to shrink. Staff _have been cut, 
and there was even a move in 
Congress to merge the Africa com-
mittee with the Latin America com-
mittee. After a concerted effort by 
the Congressional Black Caucus, the 
Washington Office on Africa, and 
the Association of Concerned 
Africanist Scholars, and others, that 
was defeated, but these are indica-
tors of a trend regarding U.S. policy 
toward Africa. 
FH: We should not expect too 
much from democracy too soon. 
There are expectations that democ-
racy will quickly get rid of corrup-
tion, improve economic manage-
ment at the top level, and create 
strong, popular, and cohesive gov-
ernments. These outsized expecta-
tions are not likely to come about 
soon, although they may emerge 
over time. The danger is that when 
democratic movements are repressed 
by intransigent regimes, as hap-
pened in Kenya, and democratic 
practices do not deliver some unam-
biguous result, there may be a ten-
dency to say, "let's find another 
enthusiasm; let's return to a kind of 
'realism' about Africa," declaring 
once again the so-called "inevitabili-
ty" of authoritarian rule in Africa. 
MF: At a minimum the U.S. should 
maintain a strong diplomatic voice 
opposing violence in South. Africa, 
Angola, the Sudan, Liberia, and else-
where. That voice will inevitably be 
stronger to the extent that individu-
als and organizations in the U.S. 
press their representatives on these 
issues, and generally help to raise the 
profile of African issues at the high-
est levels. 
Regarding Kenya, I would like 
to see the U.S. press for the removal 
of laws that have been used to 
repress the opposition - preventa-
tive detention laws, for example, but 
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there are others. This is very much 
in keeping with the opposition 
agenda. At the same time Kenya's, 
and indeed virtually all sub-Saharan 
African countries, are severely ham-
strung by international debt. What-
ever one's assessment of particular 
economic policies in Kenya and 
elsewhere in Africa, the fact remains 
that the debt is a huge albatross 
around the neck of very fragile 
economies. For most countries, sig-
n ifi cant economic progress, and 
indirectly the future legitimacy of 
regimes, including those constituted 
democratically, will hinge in part on 
lifting the debt burden. I could 
imagine, for example, an agreement 
that would cancel debt on condition 
of adoption of specific political or 
economic reforms. 
FH: We need to be aware of how 
deeply people want democratic prac-
tices and how pleased Kenyans were 
on the day of the election. That was 
palpable, you could feel it all over. At 
the polling stations people were 
proud. They had been through an 
ordeal, they had done it rather well, 
and they expected to have more of 
these ordeals. That is important to 
remember so as not to retreat to 
"economism," to the concentration 
of aid and attention in fewer coun-
tries, to a withdrawal from the sticki-
er aspects of supporting democratic 
sentiment. Finding a new balance 
between supporting democracy on 
the one hand and avoiding unpopu-
lar intrusion on the other, will be 
difficult, but it is something U.S. 
foreign policy must grapple with. • 
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health projects in Vietnam. 
ARC has addressed human rights 
and social issues in Thailand since its 
inception, recognizing its exploitation 
by the U.S. as a frondine state during 
the Vietnam war, and responding to the 
Thai government's repression of student 
demonstrators. 
During a two-day workshop last 
year on democracy in Thailand, Thais 
and their supporters organized a net-
work in North America to provide 
resources and information to foster the 
democracy movement in Thailand. 
ARC is a key coordinator for this net-
work. One of the immediate projects of 
the network was to organize a Leader-
ship Training and Network Building 
workshop for activists in recognition of 
the fact that many Thai activists needed 
to gain familiarity with the U.S. system. 
The workshop focused on such t'opics 
as: grassroots constituency building 
based on the issues; multi-cultural 
coalition building; press and media 
work; and lobbying. The intent was 
for participants to follow up from this 
event with activities in their own com-
m unities, as well as to hold additional 
leadership training projects in areas 
with large Thai communities. 
RESIST provided partial support 
for the leadership training workshop. 
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Michigan Coalition for 
Human Rights, 
4800 Woodward Ave., 
Detroit, Ml 48201. 
The Michigan Coalition for 
Human Rights (MCHR) is an inter-
faith multi-racial network of individuals 
and civic, business, labor and humani-
tarian groups working in pursuit of jus-
tice and peace, with particular interest 
in racial justice issues. The organization 
was formed in 1980 as a response to the 
rise of right wing religious groups, such 
as the Moral Majority, which were 
openly committed to injecting biblical 
principles into the U.S. government. 
The group is made up of people 
from many communities in the Detroit 
area including African-Americans and 
whites, Latinos, and Arab-Americans. 
The early years ofMCHR were devoted 
to developing educational programs 
addressing a range of peace and justice 
issues including: hunger, poverty, intru-
sion of religion into the public schools, 
welfare, lesbian and gay rights, women's 
issues, militarism, and the death penalty. 
In 1985, MCHR began its cam-
paign to stop the sale of the South 
African Krugerrand with a demonstra-
tion outside one of the country's largest 
Krugerrand sellers, and was soon able to 
dissuade many Detroit-area dealers 
from offering the coin, until it was 
banned from importation shortly there-
after. MCHR's most recent program 
has been the Freedom Tour, which 
enables city and suburban high school 
students to travel together to the South, 
to learn about the U.S. civil rights 
movement. The young people have the 
opportunity to meet and talk with key 
leaders from past and present human 
rights struggles, and develop their own 
leadership abilities. 
In March, 1992, the organization 
sponsored a 3-day Midwest Regional 
Conference on Abolishing Apartheid! 
Ending Racism: The Struggk for justice 
in South Africa and the U.S. The group's 
principal goal is to combat racism in 
Detroit, on the state level, and in 
Southern Africa. As part of its efforts to 
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promote community alliances address-
ing racial violence, the group recently 
worked with a community group in a 
predominantly white Detroit suburb to 
hold a benefit showing of the film 
"Malcolm X," and a follow-up program 
including an interracial dialogue about 
Malcolm X, his life and legacy, and the 
meaning of his message in the context 
of current work for racial justice. 
The MCHR's South Africa com-
mittee organized a 5-part film/lecture 
series this past winter entitled, A Ques-
ti.on of ]usti.ce: Challenging Apartheid 
and Racism which addressed the injus-
tice and violence of racism in South 
Africa and the U.S. including racism in 
the media and the history of labor 
union organizing among Blacks in both 
countries. The series was part of the 
Stop Apartheid's Violence campaign 
which will culminate with Soweto Day 
events in June. The Campaign includes 
a number of demonstrations and 
remembrance events and a postcard 
campaign to keep the pressure on the 
South African government. RESIST's 
recent grant was used towards printing 
and copying costs of the campaign. 
RESIST Media Arts Forum 
RESIST often provides funding for 
distribution and promotional aspects of 
media projects that are part of educa-
tional and organizing campaigns, 
although we do not fund production 
costs. We are considering screening 
some of the best videos and slide shows 
(maybe even radio shows) made by our 
grantees in a few forums in the Boston 
area. If your group has a program that 
RESIST helped fund that you'd like us 
to consider, please DON'T SEND IT 
TO US YET, but drop us a note, 
describing the project (format, length, 
subject, and how it was used,) to 
Tatiana Schreiber, at the office. 
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In each issue of the newsletter we 
highlight a few recent grants made 
to groups around the country. In this 
issue we feature grants to groups doing 
solidari-ty work in re/,arion to Africa, 
Asia, and internarionally. The infor-
ma.rion in these brief reports is pro-
vided to us by the groups themselves. 
For more details, pl.ease write to them 
at the addresses included here. 
PINTIG Cultural Group, 
2426 N. Ausrin Ave., 
Chicago, IL 60639. 
"voice" of underrepresented Filipino 
community members, advocating for 
their issues and struggles. At the same 
time, the group hopes to develop artis-
tic strength in the community, harness-
ing the creative energies of young peo-
ple, and promoting cross-cultural 
linkages among diverse groups of peo-
ple of color in the Chicago area. The 
group works to break down barriers of 
ignorance, prejudice and disunity that 
prevent community members from 
attaining an active voice in the policies 
that shape their lives. 
The 35,000 Filipinos in Chicago PINTIG is made up of 80% Fil-
and its surrounding suburbs make it ipinos and Fil-Americans, 20% whites 
one of the largest such communities in and other people of color and has a sig-
the country. The PINTIG ("pulse" or nificant number of members who are 
"heartbeat") Cultural Group was born gay and lesbian. It is currently consider-
in April, 1991 when a group of Filipino ing a production focusing on lesbian/ 
artists in the Chicago area introduced gay rights. The group is part of a coali-
to the community contemporary social tion of seven groups working to sup-
issues in the Philippines through a cul- port peace-building in the Philippines, 
tural performance. The group stayed and has worked with a number of other 
together and produced several more groups on peace issues in the Middle 
projects that same year, including two East, Korea, and elsewhere. 
benefit concerts showcasing Filipino The latest project, entitled "Ala-
progressive songs and art; an art exhibit mat" (Legend) is part of a process the 
called "Children of War," and an ''Art group calls "community empowerment 
for Peace" festival. In 1992, PINTIG through historicizing." This process 
held several workshops and perfor- aims to help the community under-
mances, increasing its membership in stand and come to terms with the lack 
the process. In the fall of 1992, the of identity and community spirit that is 
group produced and performed a the- a pervasive problem for many Filipinos, 
atre piece, ''America is in the Heart," a result of being uprooted from a cul-
which had a four-week run. tural past. Through examining the his-
PINTI G aims to serve as the tory, cultural heritage and tradition of 
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struggle of the indigenous peoples of 
the Philippines, this project aims to 
assist people in achieving a deeper grasp 
of their link to their ancestry, tracing 
Filipinos' pre-colonial experience and 
drawing out the relationships with pre-
sent-day realities. The project involves a 
series of artistic workshops on oral and 
written history, music and dance, and 
visual arts. RESIST provided funding 
for one of these workshops. 
Asia Resource Center, 
P.O. Box 15275, 
Washington, D. C, 20003. 
The Asia Resource Center (ARC) 
has provided educational resources on 
the peoples and cultures of Asia for 
some twenty years, identifying and pro-
viding analyses of critical issues that 
transcend national boundaries, includ-
ing human rights abuses, nuclear disar-
mament, justice for the poor, rights of 
women and minorities, and the impact 
of development aid. ARC publishes and 
distributes books, videos, slideshows, 
and newsletters, and provides speakers 
on a range of topics. In addition, ARC 
participates in study tours and educa-
tional programs focused on Southeast 
Asia. 
The group is actively involved in 
coalition work in a number of areas, 
such as the Campaign to Stop the 
Return of the Khmer Rouge. ARC 
works closely with Empower, a women's 
group in Bangkok that challenges the 
exploitation of prostitutes, and with 
continued on page eleven 
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